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1 Introduction
Between 1980 and 1996, state ownership in low income countries went from 16% to 8%
of GDP (Megginson and Netter (2001)). As a result, the proceeds of privatization in
non-OECD countries account for about $50 billion per year, no less than one third of the
worldwide proceeds of privatization (Mahboobi, 2000; Gibbon, 1998, 2000). In most of
the cases governments privatized public assets because of critical budgetary conditions.1
International donors and creditors, like the World Bank or the IMF, made privatization
programs a condition for economic assistance in the 1980’s context of explosive debt crisis.
Privatizations have been a major component of structural adjustment programs. Using a
panel of 18 developing countries, Davis et al. (2000) show that budgetary privatization
proceeds have been used to reduce domestic financing on a roughly one-for-one basis. The
paper studies the impact of poor budgetary conditions on the privatization decisions of
infrastructure industries and public utilities.
Market failures arise in markets with natural monopolies (i.e. firms with large economies
of scale).2 According to Walras (1936), a legal monopoly should be set to prevent wasteful
duplication of investments, and should be regulated to avoid the welfare loss associated to
monopoly pricing. This argument has generally led governments in developing countries
to control markets and production through public ownership. As a result they assumed
responsibility for the firm’s profits and losses. The possibility to transfer resources be-
tween the government and public firms generates a soft-budget constraint (Kornai 1980).
Under incomplete information, the government can hardly discriminate between good and
bad project and/or management. Ex-post, governments are likely to transfer too much
resources to firms (through subsidies or through soft bank credit and trade credit). Kornai
(2001) provides evidence of the use of soft-budget constraints by state-owned enterprises
1This has also been the case in rich countries. For instance, the first Japanese privatization were
initiated in 1982 when the Japanese public deficit reached 41.2% of GDP. Similarly in the U.S. Lopez-
de-Silanes et al. (1997) show that, privatizations have been more likely in States where fiscal constraints
were more binding.
2Empirical studies reveal that privatization results in lower prices and higher output in competitive
industries but not in natural monopolies. Changing the ownership structure does not solve for the lack
of competitive pressure (see Nellis (1999)).
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(SOEs) in developing countries.
Privatization hardens the budget constraint. Because managers and/or owners of
privatized firms assume the responsibility for the firm’s cash flows, the government is
not constrained to transfer resources to money loosing firms. There has hence been a
substantial decrease of government subsidies to formally SOEs following the reforms. For
instance the privatisation commission of Burkina Faso, reports that government subsidies
to SOEs went from 1.42 percent of GDP in 1991 to 0.08 percent of GDP in 1999 as a result
of privatisation (OECD-BAD 2003). However, the hardening of the budget constraint has
a cost. On the one hand, the government is not able to take advantage of the positive
cash flows in profitable firms. On the other hand, it abandons the direct control of firm’s
operations which has a cost to consumers. In particular empirical evidence shows that
the output prices of natural monopolies increased as a result of privatization : ”Steep
price increases following privatization have been quite common in divested network or
infrastructure industries, e.g. electricity and water and sewerage, and common but not
universal in telecommunications.” Birdsall-Nellis (2002).3 An unaccounted part of price
increases stems from the termination of illegal connections (Birdsall-Nellis 2002, Estache
et al 2002, OECD-BAD 2003).
The question addressed in this paper is whether the elimination of soft-budget con-
straint together with the cash-flow generated by privatization compensate for the price
distortion associated with private monopoly and oligopoly. Privatization is not equiva-
lent to laissez-faire because entry remains regulated (i.e., through licence and entry fees).
Nevertheless it here is treated as the move from public ownership with regulation of entry
and price to private ownership with price liberalization. This assumption is somewhat
extreme. One could reasonably argue in favor of a solution where privatization is associ-
ated with some kind of price regulation, in addition to the regulation of entry. The first
justification is theoretical. Under the complete contract approach adopted in the paper
there is no difference between public ownership and private ownership under regulation
3Prices are sometimes increased ahead of privatization in order to reduce the SOEs financing gaps
and attract buyers. This has been for instance the case for electricity tariffs in Zimbabwe, in Kenya and
in Senegal, that the government increased by 10 % after reaching an agreement with Vivendi Universal
(see OECD-BAD 2003).
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of entry and price. We thus model the difference between the two structures as a choice
between public regulated firms and private price unregulated ones. The second argument
is empirical. As stressed in Estache, Foster and Wodon (2002), in privatization reforms
governments have the choice between auctioning off the operator on the basis of the high-
est royalty payment, or waiving the royalty payment and auctioning off the service to the
party who bids the lowest service tariff. Guasch (2000) shows in a recent survey of 600
concession contracts from around the world that in most cases contracts are tendered for
the highest transfer or annual fee. Since in practice governments in developing countries
are more concerned with relieving fiscal constraint than securing tariff reductions, the
concession contracts show a move towards prices liberalization.
The paper focuses on the impact of the opportunity cost of public funds on the pri-
vatization decision. It shows that privatization of natural monopolies can be optimal
because of the tightness of the government budget constraint.4 This result is not obvious
because a benevolent regulation should be able, at worse, to mimic the private monopoly
outcome. This is at least what the revelation principle suggests. However because of
the soft-budget constraint in SOEs (and not in private structures), this intuition turns
out to be false. When public finance matters, privatization can dominate a benevolent
regulation. To illustrate this result consider the limit case where the government cannot
finance an infrastructure (e.g., a road). Privatization is an appealing alternative to the
absence of public funds. It is indeed better to have a privately owned and operated in-
frastructure, even with the monopoly distortion (e.g., a toll), than no infrastructure at
all. By continuity the result still holds when the government is able to finance the infras-
tructure. We hence show that when the profitability of the industry is low, the optimal
industrial policy is monotone in the shadow cost of public funds. For the low shadow
costs regulation dominates privatization, and it is the reverse for the large shadow costs.
The next result is a consequence of the difficulty met by developing countries to attract
investors while auctioning off their profitable SOEs.5 Empirical studies hence show that
4As in Laffont & Tirole (1993), we assume that the shadow cost of public funds summarizes the
tightness of this constraint, larger shadow costs of public funds stemming from tighter budget constraint.
5Country risk analysis is very important in today’s global investment strategies because it is the basis
of determining future expected returns of investment. Since the perception of business risk tends to be
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SOEs are generally sold at a discount (see Birdsall-Nellis 2002). With underpriced public
assets, the optimal policy is non monotone in the shadow cost of public funds. When the
shadow cost of public funds is low, the government set prices close to marginal cost and
subsidizes the regulated firm to cover the fixed cost. Rises in the shadow cost of public
funds increase the social cost of such transfers. The government prefers to let a private
firm take over for intermediate values. Finally for very large values the government which
focuses exclusively on revenue, prefers to keep profitable firms public rather than to sell
them off. Prices are set close to the private monopoly level in order to maximize profit
and thus government revenue. Then for very low values of the shadow cost (i.e., when
bailouts are cheap) or very large values (i.e. when ’holdup’ on profitable industries are
valuable) regulation is preferred to privatization. It is the reverse for intermediate value.
This non-monotonicity result has potential important policy implications. That is, while
divestiture of profitable public firms may be optimal in developed countries, it is not
necessarily optimal in developing countries where budget constraint is tight and market
institutions are weak.
Finally, when ex-ante profitability rises substantially, the market allows the entry of
more than one firm. The paper then shows that the advantage of private structures is
likely to disappear. Indeed, when a second firm is introduced, the cost of information and
soft-budget constraint in regulated firms diminish more than the cost of excessive prices
and entry in private oligopolies. In other words, market liberalization, which corresponds
to the divestiture of an historical monopoly and the introduction of new entrants, is not
equivalent to laissez-faire. In the framework of our model the divestiture of the historical
monopoly is motivated by smaller fixed costs and/or by larger product demand. The
telecommunication industry provides a good illustration of these changes. The paper
then suggests that privatization cannot succeed without an effective regulation of entry
and prices. The experience in industrialized countries shows that regulation of access
pricing to bottleneck facilities (i.e., fixed distribution network) is a key component of
successful liberalization reforms. This is a major concern in developing countries. They
higher in poor countries, this affects negatively the supply and cost of international capital flows for these
countries.
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usually lack the human ressources and the institutions for creating a credible regulatory
authority.6
1.1 Relationship with the literature
The critical problem induced by soft-bugdet constraints has firstly been coined by Kor-
nai’s (1980) as the lack of government commitment not to bail out or subsidize money-
losing firms:7 ”The softening of the budget constraint appears when the strict relationship
between expenditure and earnings of an economic unit (firms, household, etc) has been re-
laxed, because expenditure will be paid by some other institutions, typically the paternalistic
state.” (Kornai 1980). The author shows that soft-budget constraints explained many in-
efficiencies occurring in socialist economies such as shortages or low price responsiveness.
Transfers of public ownership to private ownership has hence often been grounded on the
poor economic performance of public enterprises. Since less efficient firms were allowed
to rely on the government for funding, they lacked the financial discipline required for
efficient management (Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) and Schmidt (1996a, 1996b)). In
Dewattripont and Maskin (1995) and Maskin (1999) the soft-budget constraint is caused
by the contract incompleteness between governments and firms.8 On the other hand when
governments are able to offer the same contracts to public and to private firms, for in-
stance in the form of bribes to private firms as in Kornai (2001) and Schmidt (1996), both
structures have the same degree of contract completeness and private or public ownership
is irrelevant.9
6A major concern with privatization reforms in developing countries is government commitment ability.
For instance, according to a World Bank database on Latin America, the concessions that were granted
to private operators following the divestiture of public firms have been renegotiated after an average 2.1
years only (see Laffont 2001 and Guash-Laffont-Straub 2002).
7Interesting surveys are available in Kornai (2000), Kornai, Maskin and Roland (2002) and Glaeser
and Shleifer (2003).
8In these two papers soft budget constraints affect the level of uncontractable investments made in
firms by managers. By hardening the firm’s budget constraint, privatization helps restoring appropriate
investment incentives and it improves production efficiency.
9Williamson (1985) and Grossman and Hart (1986) shown that control rights are what matters to
define ownership and that the ownership structure does not matter if complete contracts can be written.
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To be in line with the regulation literature we adopt in this paper a complete contract
approach (see Laffont-Tirole 1993). This implies that under regulation the ownership
structure is irrelevant. We then draw the line between private and public structures by
assuming that privatization leaves control and cash-flow rights to private interests.10 On
the other hand under regulation, governments control the firm’s outputs (prices, quanti-
ties and cash-flow) and firms’ managers control the firm’s input mix (technology, effort,
labor, ...). This leads to incentives problem (i.e., adverse selection). Indeed regulation is
constrained by informational asymmetries between governments and managers. To over-
come the asymmetry of information the government offers a menu of revealing contracts
to the regulated firm. To avoid the threat of service interruption it sets the contracts
so that the least productive type of firm breaks even. This implies that the other types
of firm make informational rents. Production is distorted to reduce the cost of these
rents (see Laffont and Tirole 1993). This negative effect of soft-budget constraint on the
allocative efficiency of the firm is different from the negative effect on productive effi-
ciency illuminated by the pioneer papers on privatization. In contrast the paper simply
avoids moral hazard issues. It is a contribution in regulation theory with adverse selection
that considers an alternative to the regulatory regime, namely, privatization with price
liberalization.
Finally soft-budget constraints have often been theoretically associated to a lack of eco-
nomic orientation in governments’ objectives. For instance in Kornai and Weibull (1983),
Shleifer and Vishny (1996), Debande and Friebel (2003), governments have ’parternalis-
tic’ or political behavior as they seek to protect or increase employment; in Shapiro and
Willig (1990), governments are simply malevolent. In contrast in this paper we assume,
as in Laffont and Tirole (1993), in Schmidt (1996a and 1996b) or in Segal (1998) that
government is utilitarian. It maximizes some mix of consumption and production sur-
pluses. The soft-budget constraint does not stem from the lack of government’s economic
orientation. It is just a consequence of public ownership.
10Shleifer and Vishny (1994) have demonstrated that the allocation of control right leads to economic
efficiency when control rights are congruent to cash flows rights (see definition of the latter rights in
Shleifer and Vishny, 1994 or in Roland 2000).
7
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the main as-
sumptions. Section 3 compares the performance of private and regulated monopolies
while Section 4 studies the duopoly case. Section 5 derives the optimal industrial policy.
Section 6 summarizes our results and offers some concluding remarks.
2 The model
We consider a problem of industrial policy setting. The government has to decide whether
an industry characterized by increasing returns to scale should be under public or private
control. In line with Laffont and Tirole (1993), we call regulation regime the regime in
which the government controls the production of a regulated firm. The government’s
control rights are associated with accountability on profits and losses. That is, it must
subsidize the firm in case of losses whereas it taxes the firm in case of profits. Concretely,
in the context of a developing country, this corresponds to public ownership.
In contrast, we call private regime the regime in which the government imposes no
control on the operations of a private firm, and it takes no responsibility for the firm’s
profits or losses. That is, no transfer is possible between the government and the private
firm once production has begun. This is of course a simplification. In practice govern-
ment might transfer some funds to the private sector. However subsidies are lower under
privatization than under public ownership. We normalize without any loss of generality
them to zero under public ownership. More particularly, private firms do not pay tax on
profit but they pay an entry fee. This is an artifact of the formalization. In the static
model below it is optimal for the government to sell the firm ex-ante (i.e., while it is in a
position of symmetric information vis a` vis the firm) rather than to tax its profit ex-post
(i.e., once the firm has learned its cost parameter and has an informational advantage).
The empirical evidences also show that developing countries rely on market entry fees to
raise revenues from firms (see Auriol-Walters (2003)). They are paid up front and do not
require follow up. Entry fees fill two purposes: as a tax instrument they have low admin-
istrative costs, as a barrier to market entry they are a convenient tool of government’s
industrial policy.
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To keep the analysis simple we consider a linear product demand. However the results
are robust to more general demand function (e.g., CES functions). The inverse demand
function for Q ≥ 0 units of the commodity is given by
P (Q) = a− bQ (1)
where a > 0 and b > 0 are common knowledge. The gross consumer surplus is therefore
S(Q) =
∫ Q
0
P (x)dx = aQ− b
2
Q2. (2)
On the production side there are N firms in the industry. Firm i ∈ {1, ..., N} produces
output qi. The total production in the industry is Q =
∑N
i=1 qi. Firm i ∈ {1, ..., N} has
the following cost function:
C(βi, qi, K) = K + βiqi, (3)
As in Baron-Myerson (1982), the cost function includes a fixed cost K > 0, and an
idiosyncratic marginal cost βi. Firm i must make the investment K before discovering
βi. Neither the government nor the competitors of firm i observe this firm-specific cost
parameter. The parameter βi is independently drawn from the support [β, β¯] according
to the density and cumulative distribution functions g(·) and G(·). This law is common
knowledge. We denote the expectation operator by E, the average marginal cost by Eβ,
and the variance of marginal cost by σ2 =var(β).
We focus on increasing return to scale industries. The fixed cost K is large so that
the maximal number of firms N that can survive under laissez-faire is small. To be more
specific we make the following assumption:
A0 K ≥ (a− Eβ)
2
16b
+
σ2
4b
.
Assumption A0 implies that N ∈ {0, 1, 2}.11
The firms are profit maximizer. The profit of firm i is
Πi = P (Q)qi − C(βi, qi, K) + ti (4)
where ti is the net transfer that the firm gets from the government (subsidy minus tax
and franchise fee).
11To find out how condition A0 is computed see section 4.1 footnote 21.
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The government is utilitarian and maximizes the sum of consumer and producer sur-
pluses minus the social cost of transferring public funds to the firm(s). The transfer to the
firm(s) can either be positive (i.e., a subsidy), or negative (i.e., a tax). The government’s
objective function is
W = S(Q)−
N∑
i=1
C(βi, qi, K)− λ
N∑
i=1
ti (5)
where λ is the shadow cost of public funds.12
The shadow cost of public funds, λ, drives the results of the paper. This shadow cost,
which can be interpreted as the Lagrange multiplier of the government budget constraint,
measures the social cost of the government’s economic intervention. For λ close to 0,
the government maximizes the net consumers’ surplus; for larger λ, the government puts
more weight on transfers. The shadow cost of public funds is positive because transfers
to regulated firms imply either a decrease in the production of public goods, such as
schooling and health care, or an increase in distortionary taxation. Each dollar that is
transferred to the regulated firm costs 1 +λ dollars to society. In developed economies, λ
is mainly equal to the deadweight loss accrued to imperfect income taxation. It is assessed
to be around 0.3 (Snower & Warren, 1996). In developing countries, low income levels
and difficulties in implementing effective taxation programs are strong constraints on the
government’s budget, which leads to higher values of λ. As a benchmark case the World
Bank (1998) suggests a shadow cost of 0.9. The value is much higher in countries that
are heavily indebted.
3 Private versus regulated monopoly
When K is large, a natural monopoly emerges: N ∈ {0, 1}. Since there is at most one
firm, the firm index i can be temporarily dropped. The production of the monopoly is
equal to the total production Q. Regulation aims at correcting the distortion associated
with monopoly pricing in the laissez-faire situation. Theory in regulation suggests that,
12The analysis and the results of the paper are consistent with a less optimistic view of government
objectives. It is just a matter of interpretation of λ. With a non benevolent government, λ is the weight
the government puts on the transfers it can get out of the firms (e.g., bribes).
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at worse, a benevolent regulator should be able to mimic the choice of a private firm.
Although regulation always dominates privatization under complete information, we show
that it is not always the case under asymmetric information.
3.1 Private monopoly
The production levels of private monopolies (henceforth PM) are not controlled by the
government. The government can nevertheless control the entry of private monopolies by
auctioning the right to operate. Let F (λ) ≥ 0 be the franchise fee that the private firm
pays to the government in order to operate in the product market. The private monopoly
contemplates the following sequential choices. First, the monopoly chooses to enter the
market by paying the franchise fee F (λ) and by making the investment K. If it enters,
then nature chooses the marginal cost β according to the distribution G(·). The private
firm learns β and chooses a production level Q. After the realization of β the private firm
never pays or receives a transfer from the government.
The profit of the private monopoly is
ΠPM = max
Q
P (Q)Q− C(β,Q,K)− F (λ). (6)
The optimal production is independent of K and F (λ):
QPM =
a− β
2b
. (7)
If a is smaller than the firm’s marginal cost β, the production level falls to 0. In order to
rule out corner solution in the sequel of the paper, we assume that a is not too small:
A1 a ≥ max
{
2β, β + G(β)
g(β)
}
.
Substituting QPM in equations (4) and (5), we get the ex-ante profit and welfare of a
private monopoly,
EΠPM =
1
2
V −K − F (λ), (8)
EW PM(λ) =
3
4
V −K + λF (λ) (9)
11
where
V =
E(a− β)2
2b
(10)
The value of operating the firm after the investment is made is measured by V .13 A
monopoly is privately feasible if it is ex-ante profitable, i.e. if EΠPM ≥ 0. This requires
1
2
V ≥ K and F (λ) ∈ [0, 1
2
V −K]. Similarly a monopoly is socially valuable if it brings ex-
ante positive welfare, i.e. if EW PM ≥ 0. It is easy to check that monopolies are socially
valuable but privately infeasible if 3
4
V > K > 1
2
V . Because of the government need for
cash, the ex-ante welfare EW PM(λ) increases linearly with F (λ). The maximal entry fee
that the government can collect is the maximum price a risk neutral entrepreneur would
agree to pay for the monopoly concession:
F ∗ ≡ max{0, 1
2
V −K}. (11)
In practice international capital flows depend on country risk ratings so that government
of developing countries do not collect F ∗ (see Brewer and Rivoli 1990). Because of the
service of their debt, the perception of corruption in the administration and the social
instability, the lack of transparency and predictability of their political and judicial insti-
tutions, developing countries get bad ratings.14 A consequence of the bad ratings is that
private investors, especially foreign ones, are very reluctant to invest in these countries.
For instance in 1999 foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to the 49 least develop coun-
tries (roughly 10% of the world population) was 0.5% of total world FDI flows. Since less
than 10% of this investment was cross-border merger and acquisition (including privati-
zation), privatization proceeds are dismally low in poor countries, despite sometimes a
13One can check that V = (a−Eβ)
2
2b +
σ2
2b . It can be separated into two components: the value at the
average cost, (a− Eβ)2/2b, and the value of the cost spread, σ2/2b.
14The ratings combine a range of qualitative and quantitative information. They reflect the ability and
willingness of a country to service its financial obligation. There are five different measures of country
risk: political risk, financial risk, economic risk, composite risk indices and institutional investor’s country
credit ratings. The leading rating agencies are Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s, Euromoney, Institutional
Investor, Economist Intelligence Unit, International Country Risk Guide. See for instance Global Risk
Assessments web site, www.grai.com/links.htm.
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large number of privatization.15 In the context of our model bad rating translates into
a large λ. That is, countries characterized by a large λ are also countries that get low
privatization proceeds. To capture this idea we make the following assumption.16
A2 F (λ) ∈ [0, F ∗] is a non-increasing and (weakly) convex function of λ ≥ 0.
Assumption A2 is general enough to capture the outcome of a bargaining game between
the government and a private investor that would depend on λ, or the result of an auction
where the number of bidders would be driven by λ.
3.2 Regulated monopoly.
Under public ownership, the government monitors the production of a regulated monopoly
(RM here after). It is accountable for the profits and losses of the firm. This creates a
soft-budget constraint (i.e., the public monopoly is always ex-post profitable).
The timing is as follows: The government firstly decides to make the investment K.
Secondly, nature chooses the marginal cost β according to the distribution function G(·).
Thirdly, the regulated firm’s manager learns β, but the government does not. The govern-
ment proposes a production and transfer scheme (Q(·), t(·)). Finally the regulated firm re-
veals the information β̂ and production takes place according to the contract (Q(β̂), t(β̂)).
We first study the benchmark case of regulation under symmetric information.
3.2.1 Symmetric information
When the realization of β is publicly observed the government solves max{Q,t} W s.t. Π ≥
0 with W and Π defined in (5) and (4). Since λ is positive, transfers to the regulated
firm are costly and must be reduced down to the break-even point Π = 0. That is,
tRM∗ = −P (Q)Q+K + βQ. Substituting this expression in W and maximizing W with
respect to Q yields
QRM∗(β) =
1 + λ
1 + 2λ
a− β
b
. (12)
15See http://www.ncpa.org/pd/private/oct98ab.html ’Privatization: Privatization Trends in Develop-
ing Countries’ 1997.
16We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this generalization of the function F .
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Inserting QRM∗ in (5) gives the ex-ante welfare under symmetric information
EWRM∗(λ) = (1 + λ)
(
1 + λ
1 + 2λ
V −K
)
(13)
where V is defined in equation (10). The government invests K in a regulated firm only if
(13) is positive. The ex-ante welfare increases in V . It is non-monotonic in λ if 1
2
V > K.
That is, it decreases for small λ and increases for large λ. This deserves a comment.
For small λ, the government incurs small social costs of transferring money to the
regulated firm. It then chooses quantities that are close to the first best level which
means a price that is close to marginal cost. Indeed, limλ→0QRM∗ = (a− β) /b and
therefore P [(a− β) /b] = β. At this price, the regulated monopoly cannot recover its
fixed cost. The loss is compensated by a transfer to the firm t = K > 0. By continuity,
the government will subsidize the regulated firm as long as λ remains small enough. In
contrast, for large λ, the government is more interested in receiving transfers from the
firm than in maximizing consumers surplus. It chooses production to induce a positive
profit which is confiscated through taxes. As λ becomes very large, the government seeks
the maximal revenue from the state-owned firm. In the limit it chooses the production
level of a private monopoly (i.e., limλ→∞QRM∗ = QPM = (a− β) /2b).
3.2.2 Asymmetric information
Under asymmetric information, β is not observed by the government. The government
must design the contracts such that the regulated firm reveals its private information.
Incentive compatibility constraints are added to the previous problem. By virtue of the
revelation principle, the analysis is restricted to direct truthful revelation mechanism
(β̂ = β). To avoid the technicalities of ‘bunching’ we make the classical monotone hazard
rate assumption:
A3 G(β)/g(β) is non decreasing.
We define the virtual cost as
v(β, λ) = β +
λ
1 + λ
G(β)
g(β)
. (14)
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The virtual cost includes the marginal cost of production, β, and the marginal cost of
information acquisition, λ
1+λ
G(β)
g(β)
. We deduce that v(β, λ) ≥ β, and by A3, that v(β, λ)
increases in β and λ. Let
V RM (λ) =
E(a− v(β, λ))2
2b
(15)
This implies that V RM (λ) decreases in λ. Following the Baron-Myerson’s (1982) approach,
we deduce the following lemma, which proof is standard.
Lemma 1 Under asymmetric information, the optimal production and the ex-ante wel-
fare of a regulated monopoly are those of the symmetric information case evaluated at
the virtual cost v(β, λ) . That is,
QRM (β) = QRM∗(v(β, λ)) (16)
EWRM (λ) = (1 + λ)
(
1 + λ
1 + 2λ
V RM (λ)−K
)
(17)
The quantity produced by a regulated monopoly under asymmetric information is the
quantity of a regulated monopoly under symmetric information valued at the virtual cost.
Since v(β, λ) ≥ β, we deduce that QRM (β) ≤ QRM∗(β) for any β. Moreover, since v(β, λ)
increases in β, the distortion is higher at larger marginal costs. Indeed by lowering the
production of inefficient firms, the government reduces the overall incentive to inflate cost
report. Comparing (10) and (15) it is easy to verify that V RM (λ) ≤ V for all λ ≥ 0. Hence,
the ex-ante welfare of a regulated monopoly is lower under asymmetric information than
under symmetric information: EWRM (λ) ≤ WRM∗(λ). In the next section we compare
the welfare levels generated by a private monopoly with those of a regulated monopoly.
3.3 Regulation versus privatization
As a benchmark case we first consider the symmetric information case.
Proposition 2 Under symmetric information, regulated monopoly dominates privately
feasible monopoly, whether the latter is franchised or not.
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Proof: See Appendix 1.
Proposition 2 is very intuitive. Under symmetric information a benevolent government
cannot do worse than a private monopoly because, for any realization of β, it can always
replicate the outcome of the private firm. However, it is easy to show that, for large shadow
costs of public funds, a regulated monopoly under symmetric information does not bring
much more welfare than a private monopoly when the latter pays the maximal franchise
fee, F ∗. The welfare function under regulated monopoly then is equal to EWRM∗(λ) =
((1 + λ)/ (1 + 2λ))V/2 +(1 + λ)(V/2 − K), whereas the welfare function under private
monopoly is equal to EW PMF ∗ (λ) = V/4 + (1 + λ)(V/2 − K). One can check that the
two welfare functions have a common asymptote with slope V/2 − K (see figure 1).
The welfare of a regulated monopoly coincides with the welfare of a private monopoly
for large λ. From this argument, we can infer that the additional cost introduced by
the asymmetry of information in the regulated monopoly gives a welfare advantage to
the private monopoly for large λ. That is, under asymmetric information, the welfare
function of the regulated monopoly has an asymptote with (negative or positive) slope
limλ→+∞EWRM (λ)/λ =
V RM (∞)
2
−K < V
2
−K. Let
R∞ ≡ V
RM (∞)
2
−K. (18)
We deduce that privately feasible monopolies can dominate regulated monopolies.
Proposition 3 Suppose that assumptions A0 to A3 hold and that a monopoly is privately
feasible. Then for K large enough two cases hold:17
(i) limλ→+∞ F (λ) ≥ R∞: there exists a unique threshold, λ̂, such that privatization dom-
inates regulation if and only if λ > λ̂.
(ii) limλ→+∞ F (λ) < R∞: there are two thresholds λ̂ and λ˜ (λ̂ < λ˜) such that privatization
dominates regulation if and only if λ ∈ [λ̂, λ˜].
Proof: See Appendix 2.
Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 3. The bold solid curve represents the ex-ante welfare
of regulated monopoly under symmetric information (RM ∗) and the bold dashed curve
17As shown appendix 2 the exact condition is K ≥ V (√ 2B+V RM (∞)V − 12)−B, with B = 2E(G(β)g(β) (a−β))2b .
16
displays ex-ante welfare under asymmetric information (RM). The ex-ante welfare of
regulated monopoly is non-monotone in λ. It is higher for low or high values of λ than
for intermediate values. The thin solid lines represent two bounds (i.e., F (λ) ≡ F ∗ and
F (λ) ≡ 0) of ex-ante welfare of a private monopoly (PM). Depending on the franchise
fee function, F (λ), the welfare function associated to a private monopoly varies between
these two bounds.
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λ
EWRM
Proposition 3 establishes that privatization under laissez-faire dominates a benevolent
regulation under public ownership for (at least) intermediate value of the opportunity cost
of the public fund. The result is very robust. As shown appendix 2, under the assumption
that K is large enough, which is relevant with natural monopoly, even with F (λ) ≡ 0,
the interval [λ̂0,λ˜0] where privatization dominates regulation is non empty (see figure
17
1). In other words, positive franchise fee does not explain the preference for private
feasible monopolies even if it fosters it. The intuition for this result is as follows. A
private entrepreneur enters the business if his/her firm is ex-ante profitable. After the
investment, the private firm makes a large or a low operating profit depending on the
realization of technical/demand uncertainties. A private entrepreneur, who bets her own
assets (or the shareholders’ ones) in the firm, is accountable for these profits and losses. In
contrast, under regulation, accountability lies on the government side; the business risk is
borne by the government that has to grant ex-post subsidies to unprofitable firms. Under
symmetric information, the soft-budget constraint plays no role because the government
perfectly controls the firm’s cost and profit. This is illustrated in figure 1 by the fact that,
even for F (λ) ≡ F ∗, EWRM∗(λ) is always above EW PMF ∗ (λ) ∀λ ≥ 0. However, under
asymmetric information, the regulated firm uses the soft-budget constraint to acquire a
positive informational rent. The government prefers that the private sector takes over
when the social cost associated with the rent outweighs the social benefit of controlling
the firm’s operation. As shown section 5 this ultimately depends on the profitability of
the industry.
Positive franchise fee increases the preference for private monopoly. When the fran-
chise fee F (λ) is large (i.e., F (λ) ≥ R∞ ∀λ ≥ 0), the shadow costs supporting privatization
belong to an unbounded range [λ̂,+∞) (Proposition 3 (i)). The optimal industrial policy
is monotone in λ. Regulation is preferred to privatization for λ ≤ λ̂, and it is the reverse
for λ > λ̂. On the other hand, when the franchise fee falls below the threshold R∞, reg-
ulation re-dominates privatization for large value of λ (Proposition 3 (ii)). The optimal
industrial policy then is non monotone in λ. For intermediate value of λ privatization
with price liberalization dominates regulation under public ownership. It is the reverse
for lower and larger value of λ. The intuition for this result is as follow. Governments
of developing countries coping with critical budgetary situation are in weak bargaining
position in privatization reforms. They let their public assets go at a discount to avoid the
embarrassment of unsuccessful sales (see Birdsall-Nellis 2002). In contrast under public
ownership they legally seize the firms’ profit which provides regular revenue inflows. For
instance over the period 1990-95, tax collected from public firms amounted to 8% of GDP
18
in Bolivia, 2.2% in Brazil, 5% in Chile, 1% in India, 3% in Mexico, 3% in Peru (World
Bank 1998). ”On the whole this non-tax revenue is more important for developing than
opposed to industrial countries, comprising about 21 percent compared to 10 percent of
total revenue.” (Burgess and Stern (1993) page 782). We deduce that because of this
public convenience governments of developing countries should resist the privatization of
their profitable state owned enterprises, which in practice they do. For instance one third
of the privatizations to end 1996 in Africa were liquidations or asset sales of unprofitable
firms (Sarbib 1997). Similarly Namibia is one of the few countries in the world without
privatization plan, mainly because its publics enterprises are operating at a profit (Harsch
2002).
Proposition 3 contrasts with the results obtained in the main strand of the literature on
soft-budget constraint (see for instance Schmidt (1996b), Maskin (1999) and Segal (1998)).
In this literature, privatization is socially efficient because it avoids the time-inconsistency
problem raised by regulation. That is, under regulation the firm anticipates that subsidies
to unprofitable firms will be granted since such subsidies are ex-post efficient. Hence, a
firm with low profitability prospects will ex-ante deflate its investment level, which is
inefficient. Here, the investment K is fixed and common knowledge. The choice between
the regulated and the private regime is made before the investment is realized. Therefore,
the government is not allowed to take advantage of any investment sunk by the private
sector. Still, privatization is socially desirable due to macro-economic considerations.
3.4 Simulation of λ̂
Proposition 3 highlights the unconventional role of the shadow cost of public funds in the
government’s choice of industrial policy. In particular, whether the firm makes a transfer
to the government or not, privatization with prices liberalization dominates a benevolent
regulation under public ownership for intermediate value of λ. The relevance of this result
depends on what ’intermediate’ value means. If it is very high, in practice privatisation
will never be optimal. In what follows we assess the lowest value of the shadow cost,
λ̂, for which privatization becomes attractive. This is by definition when the highest
franchise fee F ∗ is applied: λ̂ solves EWRM (λ) = EW PMF ∗ (λ) (see figure 1). This equation
19
is equivalent to
4(1 + λ)2V RM (λ) = (3 + 2λ)(1 + 2λ)V. (19)
Using (14) and (15), we observe that this expression defines a second degree equation in
λ. In order to get explicit value for λ̂, we make the assumption of a uniform distribution
of β over [β, β]. Still, the conclusions of the simulation are robust to other statistical
specifications (e.g. normal distribution). Under the uniform distribution, equation (19)
is equivalent to: 4E((1 + 2λ)(a−β)−λ(a−β))2 = (3 + 2λ)(1 + 2λ)E(a−β)2. We divide
the right hand side and the left hand side by a2. One can then check that λ̂ depends on
β/a and β/a only. Since under the uniform specification the demand intercept a satisfies
A1 if and only if a ≥ 2β, we get that 0 ≤ β/a < β/a ≤ 0.5. Table 1 displays λ̂ for the
various admissible values of β/a and β/a.
λ̂ β/a = 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
β¯/a = 0.1 1.14 - - - -
0.2 0.71 1.07 - - -
0.3 0.52 0.66 0.99 - -
0.4 0.42 0.48 0.60 0.90 -
0.5 0.35 0.38 0.44 0.54 0.81
Table 1: Minimal shadow costs λ̂ above which privatisation can be preferred
The shadow cost of public funds is generally assessed to be around 0.3 in industrial
countries (see for instance Ballard-Shoven-Whalley (1985)) and higher in developing coun-
tries. We conclude from the simulation that if demand and cost functions are reasonably
approximated by linear functions and satisfy assumption A1, which is an empirical issue,
λ̂ lies in the range of the shadow costs prevailing in developing countries. The results in
Table 1 also illuminate that privatisation is more likely as technological uncertainty rises
(i.e., λ̂ decreases with (β − β)/a). Indeed larger business uncertainty implies stronger
information asymmetry between firms and government and hence larger information cost
in the regulated structures.
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We next explore the optimal industrial organization when the fixed cost K becomes
smaller or equivalently, when the value of operating the firm after investment, V , be-
comes larger.18 This is relevant because in the last two decades some industries such as
the telecommunication have experienced dramatic technological and/or demand changes
resulting both in a decrease in fixed costs and an increase in demand. Moreover, for a
given industry the demand is generally weaker in developing countries than in industrial-
ized countries, resulting in lower V . That is, for the same population size, the number of
consumers and their propensity to pay are higher in rich countries. This difference might
again imply different industrial policy. We study the case of a private duopoly section
4.1, and of a regulated duopoly section 4.2.
4 Private and regulated duopoly
4.1 Private duopoly
To simplify the exposition we rule out in what follows franchising. The results are never-
theless robust to more favorable specifications of the franchise fee.19
A4 F (λ) ≡ 0 .
Private duopoly (PD here after) is modeled as Cournot duopoly with asymmetric
information between firms. Each firm gets private information on its own marginal cost
but it is not informed about the competitor’s marginal cost. As in any Cournot game,
each firm maximizes its profit taking the other firm’s output as given. The timing of the
game is as follows: First both firms simultaneously make the investments K. Second,
each firm i ∈ {1, 2} learns the realization of its own marginal cost βi and chooses its
18From figure 1, we see that a private monopoly is less likely to be preferred to a regulated monopoly
as K/V diminishes. However this result is incomplete. For lower K/V more than one firm may enter the
market.
19Considering F > 0 would reinforce the biais in favor of the private monopoly because franchise fees
are higher with a monopoly than with a duopoly.
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production level qi. The equilibrium concept is Bayesian Nash equilibrium:
q∗i ∈ argmaxqi Eβj
[
(a− b(qi + q∗j ))qi − βiqi
]
∀i = 1, 2, j 6= i. (20)
Due to the linear shapes of the demand and cost functions, firm i’s best response strategy
is equal to q∗i (βi) = (2a+ Eβ − 3βi) /6b.20 The existence of a duopoly with both firms
producing at the equilibrium requires that a ≥
(
3β¯ − Eβ
)
/2, which is true under as-
sumption A1. Substituting (q∗1(β1), q
∗
2(β2)) in (4) and (5), we compute the ex-ante firm
profit and the industry welfare of the Cournot duopoly
EΠPD =
2
9
V +
5
18
σ2
2b
−K, (21)
EW PD =
8
9
V +
11
18
σ2
2b
− 2K. (22)
A duopoly is privately feasible if the two firms are ex-ante profitable. It means that
expression (21) should be positive.21 A private duopoly is socially desirable if it brings
more welfare than a private monopoly. That is, if EW PD ≥ EW PM . Let KPD/PM be the
level of fixed cost such that the government is indifferent between a private duopoly and
a private monopoly, i.e. EW PD = EW PM . From (9) and (22), we compute
KPD/PM =
5
36
V +
11
18
σ2
2b
. (23)
Walras (1936) and Spence (1976) have shown in a context of symmetric information
that industries with increasing returns to scale were characterized by excess entry. The
next result shows that the presence of asymmetric information does not alter this result
of wasteful competition.
Lemma 4 Under asymmetric information there is excessive entry. Privately feasible
duopolies are socially undesirable whenever 5
36
V + 11
18
σ2
2b
≤ K ≤ 2
9
V + 5
18
σ2
2b
.
20For more on Cournot competition under asymmetric information see Sakai (1985), Shapiro (1986)
and Raith (1996).
21More generally the expected profit of N firms playing a generalized Cournot competition is ENΠi =
2V
(N+1)2 +
(N−1)(N+3)
2(N+1)2
σ2
2b −K with N ≥ 1. We deduce that if V8 + 38 σ
2
2b ≤ K ≤ 2V9 + 518 σ
2
2b then N ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
This yields assumption A0.
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The set defined by the condition in Lemma 4 is not empty since 5
36
V + 11
18
σ2
2b
< 2
9
V + 5
18
σ2
2b
is equivalent to a > Eβ +
√
3σ which is true under A1. Therefore, the ex-ante welfare
is higher if a private monopoly is legally set and if entry is prevented. Indeed, firms do
not internalize the social cost of the investment duplication in their entry decision. As a
result they enter too often in the industry.
4.2 Regulated duopoly
Many contributions in procurement and regulation theory emphasize that despite sub-
additive cost functions, it can be optimal to have several producers in a regulatory setting.
A regulated duopoly can be better than a regulated monopoly because it increases the
variety of products, lowers transportation costs, or because it reduces prices through
(yardstick) competition. In the present model, the firms’ marginal cost are independent
and identically distributed. The benefit of choosing a regulated duopoly originates from
the sampling gain as first analyzed by Auriol and Laffont (1993).
4.2.1 The sampling effect under symmetric information
The timing is the same as for a regulated monopoly with the following differences: the
investment K is made in the two regulated firms (henceforth RD) and the marginal cost
parameters βi with i ∈ {1, 2} are independently drawn. Under symmetric information
the transfers t∗i to the regulated firms i ∈ {1, 2} which are socially costly, are reduced
until firms break even: t∗i = −(a− bQ)qi + βiqi +K. Substituting this expression into the
welfare function yields
WRD∗ = S(Q) + λP (Q)Q− (1 + λ)(β1q1 + β2q2 + 2K). (24)
The welfare function is linear in q1 and q2. Optimizing it with respect to qi we deduce
that q∗i = Q
RD > 0 if βi = min{β1, β2} and q∗i = 0 otherwise. The optimal produc-
tion level coincides with the level of the regulated monopoly defined in equation (12):
QRD∗(β1, β2) = QRM∗(min{β1, β2}). Monitoring a regulated duopoly is equivalent to
monitoring a regulated monopoly for which the investment level is 2K and the marginal
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cost is distributed as βmin = min{β1, β2}, that is, with the law:
gmin(β) = 2(1−G(β))g(β). (25)
The ex-ante welfare of the regulated duopoly under symmetric information is
EWRD∗(λ) = (1 + λ)
(
1 + λ
1 + 2λ
V min − 2K
)
(26)
where
V min =
∫ β¯
β
(a− β)2
2b
gmin(β)dβ. (27)
The facts that gmin(·) stochastically dominates g(·) and that (a − β)2/2b decreases in β
imply that V min > V . Then comparing (13) and (26), the ex-ante welfare is larger under
a regulated duopoly than under a regulated monopoly if the sampling gain, measured by
(V min − V ) (1 + λ) / (1 + 2λ), is larger than K, the duplicated investment.22
4.2.2 Asymmetric information
Under asymmetric information, the two regulated firms must be enticed to reveal their pri-
vate information to the government. By the revelation principle, the analysis is restricted
to direct revelation mechanisms. The equilibrium is defined as truthful Bayesian Nash
equilibrium. Each firm i ∈ {1, 2} sets its revelation strategy β̂i such that it maximizes
the expected profit given the cost distribution of the competitor j 6= i. Let
V RD(λ) =
∫ β¯
β
(a− v(β, λ))2
2b
gmin(β)dβ. (28)
The following lemma presents the structure of production and the welfare level of the
duopoly under asymmetric information.
22Only one firm produces at the equilibrium. This is an artifact of the assumption of constant marginal
costs which is used to isolate the sampling effect. Models with non-constant marginal costs yield qualita-
tively similar results (see Auriol-Laffont 1993). Finally we assume that the government shuts down the
least efficient regulated firm for the sake of readability. It could instead transfer the best technology to all
regulated firms and share the optimal production QRD∗ among them. The analysis would be unaltered.
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Lemma 5 Under asymmetric information, only the firm with the lowest marginal cost
produces. Output and welfare levels are the levels obtained under symmetric information
evaluated at the virtual cost:
QRD(β1, β2) = Q
RM
(
v(βmin, λ)
)
, (29)
EWRD(λ) = (1 + λ)
(
1 + λ
1 + 2λ
V RD(λ)− 2K
)
. (30)
Proof: The proof is similar as in Auriol-Laffont (1993) Proposition 2.
Monitoring a regulated duopoly is equivalent to monitoring a regulated monopoly for
which the investment level is 2K, the marginal cost is v(βmin, λ) and βmin is distributed
according to gmin(·). Let KRM/RD(λ) be the value of the fixed cost such that the govern-
ment is indifferent between a regulated monopoly and a regulated duopoly, i.e. such that
EWRM (λ) = EWRD(λ).
K
RM/RD
(λ) =
1 + λ
1 + 2λ
(
V RD(λ)− V RM (λ)
)
(31)
Under asymmetric information, the sampling gain is measured by K
RM/RD
(λ). Since the
distribution function gmin(β) stochastically dominates g(β) and since (a − v(β, λ))2/2b
decreases in β we deduce that V RD(λ) ≥ V RM (λ). However the larger λ is, the lower
is the impact of the sampling gain and the smaller is the government’s preference for
regulated duopoly.
4.3 Private versus regulated duopoly
We have seen in Section 3 that private monopoly can be preferred to regulated monopoly.
By extension, private duopoly could also be preferred to monopoly or regulated duopoly.
However, excess entry and weak competition intensity in private duopoly will generally
preclude this structure from being socially desirable. To be more specific let K
RD/PD
(λ)
be the value of the fixed cost such that regulated duopoly is equivalent to private duopoly,
i.e. such that EWRD(λ) = EW PD. The government prefers a regulated duopoly to a
private duopoly if and only if K ≤ KRD/PD(λ). On the other hand, if K ≥ KPD/PM
defined in equation (23), the government prefers a private monopoly to a private duopoly.
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We deduce that if
C1 K
RD/PD
(λ) ≥ KPD/PM
a private duopoly is never preferred by the government. Appendix 3 shows that assump-
tion C1 holds if the demand parameter a is not too small. For instance if βi is uniformly
distributed over [0, β] then A1 implies C1.
Lemma 6 Under assumption C1 a private duopoly is never optimal.
We now turn to the study the optimal industrial policy.
5 Optimal industrial policy
Under complete information, the government can always replicate the production decisions
of private firms so that privatization is never optimal. The optimal industrial policy varies
from no production, regulated monopoly to regulated duopoly according to whether the
investment cost K is large, medium or small. Under asymmetric information the soft-
budget constraint alters this result. That is, let K
RM
(λ) be the value of the fixed cost
such that the government is indifferent between a regulated monopoly and no production
(i.e. such that EWRM (λ) = 0). It is easy to check that
K
RM
(λ) =
1 + λ
1 + 2λ
V RM (λ). (32)
Similarly let K
RM/PM
(λ) be the value of the fixed cost such that the government is indif-
ferent between a regulated monopoly and a private monopoly (i.e. such that EWRM (λ) =
EW PM). It is easy to check that
K
RM/PM
(λ) =
(1 + λ)2
λ(1 + 2λ)
V RM (λ)− 3V
4λ
. (33)
We deduce the next result.
Proposition 7 Suppose that assumptions A0 to A4 hold. Under condition C1, the op-
timal industrial policy under asymmetric information is to set:
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• no production if K > max
{
V
2
, K
RM
(λ)
}
;
• a private monopoly if KRM/PM (λ) < K ≤ V
2
;
• a regulated monopoly if KRM/RD(λ) < K ≤ min
{
K
RM/PM
(λ), V
2
}
or if V
2
≤ K <
K
RM
(λ);
• a regulated duopoly if K ≤ KRM/RD(λ).
Proof. See Appendix 4
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Figure 2: Optimal Industrial Policy
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Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 7 in (λ,K) space. It allows to consider three types of
market organisation for infrastructure and public utilities.
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The first case occurs when the ex-ante profitability of the infrastructure project or
of the industry is low (i.e., for K ≥ KRM (+∞)). When K is large there is room for at
most one firm. The optimal industrial policy then is monotone in the shadow cost of
public funds. We distinguish two cases. First when K is larger than V/2 the project is
not privately feasible. Depending on λ being either low or high the optimal industrial
policy is regulation (in wealthy countries) or no production (in poor countries). In figure
2 regulated monopolies that are desirable under asymmetric information are depicted by
the white area denoted RM , no production corresponds to the area denoted ∅. Second
when K falls below V/2, the project becomes privately feasible for one firm. Regulation is
preferred to privatization if λ ≤ λ̂ and it is the reverse otherwise. When K is close to V/2
private monopoly is preferred for large λ simply because it is feasible whereas regulated
monopoly is not. By continuity private monopoly dominates regulated monopoly for lower
values of the fixed cost. This situation is denoted PM and is represented by the hatched
area above the curve K
RM/PM
.
It is worth noting that under the paper assumptions the critical value λ̂ lies in the
range of the shadow cost of public funds generally retained for developing economies (i.e.,
λ̂ ∈ [0.35, 1.10]).23 They may hence implement industrial policies that strongly differ
from those implemented in developed economies. Indeed there are a public good aspect
and externalities associated to sunk cost investment such as infrastructure (e.g., a road).
As recommended by standard economic theory wealthy nations subsidize the construc-
tion of the infrastructure and let people use it at marginal cost (e.g., for free). With a
low opportunity cost of public funds this policy maximizes welfare. On the other hand
many developing countries plagued by financial problems have started build-operate-and-
transfer (BOT) programs. In such programs, a private firm finances the sunk cost of an
infrastructure, for instance a highway, in exchange for a 10-30 years licence to exploit
it in a monopoly position. Clearly, a privately owned and operated infrastructure, even
with the monopoly distortion (e.g., a toll), is a better solution than no infrastructure at
all, which is, in the absence of public financing, the alternative to privatization. Water
23The critical value λ̂ is the same in figure 1 and 2. Indeed λ̂ in figure 2 is such that KRM/PM (λ) = V2 .
It is easy to check that this equation is equivalent to equation (19).
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supply, which typically is provided worldwide through public ownership, could be a good
candidate for such type of privatization. This is at least what is advocated by Brook
Cowen and Cowen (1998). In developing countries tariffs are so low that on average they
do not cover half of the total cost (World Bank 1994). This precludes public investment,
and large fraction of the population in cities has no formal water hook-up. To increase
access some countries have chosen to implement BOT contracts. China, Malaysia, Thai-
land implemented it in water, and Chile, Mexico, in sanitation (World Bank 1997). The
drawback of such privatization policy is that it increases inequality. That is, rise in pub-
lic utility tariffs (to reach costs recovery level), recovery of unpaid bills and termination
of illegal connexion hurt the poor. On the other hand, extension of the network favor
those who are wealthy enough to access the new infrastructure. In their survey on pri-
vatization Birdsall-Nellis (2002) hence show that the reforms have worsened wealth and
income distribution (see also Estache-Foster-Wodon 2002). This in turn might explain
why privatizations are so unpopular.24
We believe that privatization is a good alternative to the absence of public funds if
it leads to an increase of available infrastructure such as roads, railroads, or distribution
networks. Nevertheless the reforms have to be accompanied by subsidies in direction of the
poor (either directly from government, or international institutions, or from the wealthy
part of the consumers through cross-subsidies) to constitue genuine Pareto improvement.
Last, but not least, governments with bad country ratings might find impossible to attract
international investors on low profitability projects. They should rather target national
private investors or national NGOs which are better informed on local profitability and
risk.
The second case occurs when K belongs to [V min − V,KRM (+∞)]. When K is lower
than K
RM
(+∞) the market offer good ex-ante prospects to one firm. Production (with a
monopoly) is always optimal. However, contrary to the low profitability case, the optimal
industrial policy is non monotone in λ. This is illustrated Figure 2 by the fact that the
24For instance 63% of people surveyed in 2001 in 17 countries of Latin America disagreed or strongly
disagreed with the statement ”The privatization of state companies has been beneficial” (The Economist
July 28-August 3 2001, p38). There is a widespread perception that they have been hurting the poor,
notably through increase in tariff and unemployment, while benefiting the powerful and wealthy.
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curve denoted K
RM/PM
(λ) is non monotone in λ. Let K
RM/PM
denote the minimum of
K
RM/PM
(λ). For K
RM/PM ≤ K ≤ KRM (+∞), as λ increases, the optimal industrial policy
successively is regulation, privatization and regulation. Indeed when λ is very large the
government seeks the maximal revenue from the firm. Privatization which generates low
proceeds (because of the high λ) is not appealing. It is better to keep the profitable firm
public, while fixing its price close to monopoly level, than to sell it off. This generates
more revenue. Prior to the technological boom the telecommunication industry illustrated
this non monotonicity result: “A PTT[Post and Telecommunication Company]’s yearly
revenues (especially charges from international call) were used by governments to subsidize
mail service, or to ease yearly budget deficits. Given this public convenience and necessity,
the interests of third world governments are often diametrically opposed to telecom policies
of privatization and network deregulation favored by wealthy nations.” (Anania 1992).
Finally, when V/2 is much larger than K (i.e., when K ≤ Vmin−V ), markets offer good
ex-ante prospects to more than one firm. Lemma 6 then shows that a private Cournot
duopoly is never optimal. The negative impact of market power and excessive entry
are too strong compare to the positive effects (here the ‘sampling gains’) of a regulated
duopoly. In other words, the advantage of prices unregulated private structures disappears
once the market allows the entry of more than one firm. This result may look at odds
with theories where private structures perform better with larger number of entry (see for
instance Vickers and Yarrow (1991) and Segal (1998)). A basic difference in our model lies
in the intensity of competition that exists within private and regulated structures. Under
privatization the firms, which must make a profit to cover their fixed cost, face a Cournot
competition. In contrast, under the regulation regime, the information cost drops when a
second firm is added in the regulated market. This result is congruent with the theory of
adverse selection in which a rise in the number of agents reduces the cost of information
revelation (see Auriol & Laffont (1993)).25 The case where regulated duopoly is preferred
to regulated monopoly is depicted by the hatched area below the curve K
RM/RD
denoted
25If we had considered that firms operating in the same industry have correlated costs, we would
have used this correlation to implement yardstick competition, reducing further the cost of information
revelation (see Auriol and Laffont 1993).
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RD.
This last result sheds light on the link between market liberalization, on the one
hand, and technological and/or product demand changes, on the other hand. Market
liberalization, often referred to as ’deregulation’, corresponds to the divestiture of the
historical monopoly and the introduction of new entrants. As shown Proposition 7 this
is not equivalent to laissez-faire. In practice prices and entry remain regulated to protect
consumers against collusion and predatory behavior (through licences and price caps for
instance). In the framework of our model the divestiture of the historical monopoly
is motivated by a drop of the ratio K/V . That is, by smaller fixed costs and/or by
larger product demand. In figure 2 this corresponds to a downward shift, where industry
structure move from regulated monopoly to regulated duopoly.
The telecommunication industry provides an example of such drop. In this industry,
the introduction of new technologies has significantly reduced the fixed costs to operate
networks whereas the demand for communication has steadily increased. Consistently
with our model, many developed and developing countries have deregulated their domes-
tic telecommunication industry. Nevertheless more than 70 percent of all countries still
maintain a monopoly in basic services, while more than half allow competition in mobile
service (ITU 1999). Wallsten (2000), who studied telecom reforms in Africa and Latin
America, found that regulated competition (measured as the number of mobile operators
not owned by the incumbent) yields network improvements and that, while privatization
by itself does not yield improvements, privatization combined with an independent reg-
ulator does. The lesson to be drawn here is that privatization, being defined as a move
from regulation to laissez-faire, is not optimal. When the ratio K/V is low, the consumer
surplus is large. The industry matters for social welfare and growth. With an oligopolis-
tic structure and potential large rents to make the predatory and collusive behavior of
the firms need to be controlled. In practice regulation is a key component of successful
liberalization reforms.
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6 Conclusion
Considering the government budget constraint, the paper compares utilitarian welfare
levels under regulation and privatization in markets characterized by increasing returns
to scale. Under public ownership the government which regulates entry and price, is
residual claimant for the firm’s profit and loss. By contrast, under privatization, the
government takes no responsibility for the financial results of the firms. This rules out
the problem of soft-budget constraint. The cost is that prices are unregulated.
We show that for investments with low ex-ante profitability (e.g., a road) privatiza-
tion always dominates regulation for intermediate to large value of the opportunity cost
of public funds. Privatization is even Pareto improving when it leads to the creation
of an infrastructure that would not have exist otherwise. Simulations suggest that the
critical ’intermediate’ values compatible with the model assumptions, are in the range
of those of developing countries. On the other hand, for profitable natural monopolies
(e.g., telecommunication fix distribution network) the optimal industrial policy is non
monotone in the shadow cost of public funds. Indeed developing countries plagued with
financial problems get bad country risk ratings. They are not able to attract international
capital flows so that privatization does not yield large revenue. Since public firms are sold
at a discount, government in need for cash should keep the profitable ones. It can then
choose monopoly prices and legally capture the profit. We finally show that the advan-
tage of private structures is likely to disappear once the market allows the entry of more
than one firm. Technological or demand changes explain the destitution of former regu-
lated monopolies. Smaller fixed costs and larger product demands hence favor markets
liberalization which to be successful requires an efficient regulation.
To conclude the optimal industrial policy of a country depends non-trivially on its
development stage. We believe these arguments are particularly critical to the LDCs
in which due to bad macro-economic conditions and to poorly functioning tax systems
governments’ budget constraint is extremely tight.
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Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 2
We have to show that (1 + λ)
(
1+λ
1+2λ
V −K
)
≥ 1
2
V −K + λF (λ) ∀λ ≥ 0 The maximal
franchise fee, denoted F ∗, is equal to the firm’s ex-ante profit, i.e. F ∗ = 1
2
V −K. Therefore
the above inequality is satisfied if ∀λ ≥ 0 (1 +λ)
(
1+λ
1+2λ
V −K
)
≥ 3
4
V −K +λ
(
1
2
V −K
)
,
or equivalently if 4 (1 + λ)2 ≥ (3 + 2λ) (1 + 2λ) which is always true ∀λ ≥ 0.
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Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 3
Step 1: Regulation is preferred to privatization if and only if EW
RM
(λ) ≥ EW PM (λ).
By virtue of equation (17) this inequality is equivalent to
(1 + λ)2
1 + 2λ
V RM (λ)− (1 + λ)K ≥ 3
4
V −K + λF (λ). (34)
Developing V
RM
(λ) defined equation (15) one can check that:
V
RM
(λ) =
1 + 2λ
(1 + λ)2
V +
λ2
(1 + λ)2
V
RM
(∞)− λ
(1 + λ)2
B (35)
where V =
E((a−β)2)
2b
, V RM (∞) = E((a−β−
G(β)
g(β)
)
2
)
2b
and B = 2
E(G(β)
g(β)
(a−β))
2b
are all positive by
virtue of assumption A1. Substituting (35) in (34) and dividing the right and left hand
side by λ, we get after some straightforward computations:
V
4λ
≥ B
1 + 2λ
− λ
1 + 2λ
V RM (∞) +K + F (λ). (36)
It is easy to check that the left hand side of (36), denoted LHS(λ), is a decreasing and
convex function of λ. Similarly, under the assumption A2 the right hand side of (36),
denoted RHS(λ), is decreasing and convex.
Step 2: For λ = 0, (36) is equivalent to V ≥ 0 which is always true. We deduce that
for λ small enough regulation dominates privatization.
For λ → +∞ two cases hold: either limλ→+∞ LHS(λ) > limλ→+∞RHS(λ), which is
equivalent to F (+∞) < R∞, or limλ→+∞ LHS(λ) ≤ limλ→+∞RHS(λ), which is equiva-
lent to R∞ ≤ F (+∞) where R∞ = V RM (∞)
2
−K.
Consider first the case R∞ ≤ F (+∞). This condition implies that for λ large enough
privatization is preferred to regulation. Since it is the reverse for λ low enough, and since
LHS(λ) and RHS(λ) are both decreasing and convex in λ, we deduce that they cross
one and only one. This proves part (i) of proposition 3.
Step 3: Consider next the case R∞ > F (∞). This condition implies that for large
enough λ, regulation is preferred to privatization. Since this is also true for low enough
λ, and since both functions LHS(λ) and RHS(λ) are decreasing and convex in λ, we
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deduce the following possibilities: first, LHS(λ) and RHS(λ) never cross, in which case
regulation is always preferred to privatization, second, they cross twice which yields part
(ii) of proposition 3.
Step 4: To complete the proof of proposition 3 we need to show that there are at
least some values of the parameters such that LHS(λ) and RHS(λ) cross twice. Since
privatization is less attractive for smaller franchise fees, a sufficient condition is that
LHS(λ) andRHS(λ) crossing twice for F = 0. By virtue of (34) when F = 0 privatization
is preferred to regulation if and only if (1+λ)
2
1+2λ
V
RM
(λ)− (1 + λ)K < 3
4
V −K. Substituting
V RM (λ) defined equation (35) the inequality becomes after some computations
P (λ) = (V RM (∞)− 2K)λ2 + (V/2−B −K)λ+ V/4 < 0. (37)
Inequality (37) is satisfied for λ ∈ (λ̂(K), λ˜(K)) with 0 < λ̂(K) < λ˜(K) under three
conditions:
(i) (V/2−B −K)2 > V (V RM (∞)− 2K).
(ii) V/2−B −K < 0
(iii) V RM (∞)− 2K > 0
That is, condition (i) yields a positive discriminant for P (λ) = 0 and thus implies the
existence of two roots λ̂(K) and λ˜(K); condition (ii) and (iii) imply positivity for both
roots of P (λ) = 0; finally since P (0) > 0 and limλ→+∞ P (λ) > 0 under (iii) we have that
P (λ) < 0 for λ ∈ (λ̂(K), λ˜(K)).
Note that because F (∞) ≥ 0, condition R∞ > F (∞) assumed under step 3 implies
that condition (iii) is always satisfied. Now condition (ii) is satisfied if V
2
− B < K. We
deduce that conditions (ii) and (iii) are satisfied if and only if K ∈ (V
2
− B, V RM (∞)
2
).
This is a non empty set since V RM (∞) = V − B + E[(G(β)/g(β))2/2b]. Then, observe
that the left hand side of condition (i) is equal to zero at K = V
2
− B and increases
for larger K. The right hand side of condition (i) decreases with K and is equal to
zero at K = V
RM (∞)
2
. Hence there exists a unique K̂ ∈ (V
2
− B, V RM (∞)
2
) such that
(V/2−B −K)2 = V (V RM (∞)− 2K). Solving this equation one can check that
K̂ = V
(√
2B+V RM (∞)
V
− 1
2
)
−B. (38)
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To conclude we have just shown that conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) are satisfied for any
K ∈ (K̂, V RM (λ)
2
) which is a non empty set. This complete the proof of proposition 3. It
is independent of the cost distribution.
Appendix 3: Condition C1
One can check that KRD/PD(λ) = (1+λ)
2
2λ(1+2λ)
V RD(λ)− 4
9
V
λ
− 11
9
σ2
8bλ
. We deduce that condition
C1 is equivalent after some straightforward computations to
18(1 + λ)2
(1 + 2λ)(16 + 5λ)
V RD(λ) ≥ V + 1 + 2λ
16 + 5λ
11σ2
2b
. (39)
Let v(β, λ) = β + λ
1+λ
G(β)
g(β)
be the virtual cost. Simplifying by 2b, C1 is equivalent to:
18(1 + λ)2
(1 + 2λ)(16 + 5λ)
Eβmin
[
(a− v(β, λ))2
]
≥ Eβ
[
(a− β)2
]
+
(1 + 2λ)11σ2
16 + 5λ
. (40)
Let h(λ) = 18(1+λ)
2
(1+2λ)(16+5λ)
− 1 = 2−λ+8λ2
(1+2λ)(16+5λ)
> 0 ∀λ ≥ 0.
Let Φ(λ) = Eβmin [v(β, λ)
2] +
Eβmin [(v(β,λ)2]−Eβ[β2]
h(λ)
− (1+2λ)11σ2
(16+5λ)h(λ)
.
Let Γ(λ) = E
βmin
[v(β, λ)] +
E
βmin
[v(β,λ)]−Eβ
h(λ)
.
Condition C1 then is equivalent to:
a2 − a2Γ(λ) + Φ(λ) ≥ 0. (41)
Note first that if Γ(λ) ≤ 0 and Φ(λ) ≥ 0 then condition (41) is always true. Similarly if
Γ(λ)2 ≤ Φ(λ) condition (41) is always true. We consider next Γ(λ)2 > Φ(λ). In this case
condition (41) is true if a is larger than al.
al = Max
{
Γ(λ) +
√
Γ(λ)2 − Φ(λ); Γ(λ)−
√
Γ(λ)2 − Φ(λ)
}
In other words condition (41) requires that a is large enough. The condition is not
very strong. For instance, for a uniform distribution, C1 is always true under assumption
A1. That is, with an uniform distribution over [0, β], and with the convention that
a = Aβ, condition C1 is equivalent after some computation to: H(A) = 12A2(8λ2 −
λ + 2) + 12A(4 − 7λ)(1 + 2λ) + (1 + 2λ)(44λ − 59) ≥ 0. Under the assumption A1 (i.e.,
A ≥ 2), it is easy to check that H(A) is increasing in A for all λ ≥ 0. We deduce that
H(A) ≥ H(2) = 136λ2 − 98λ+ 133 > 0 ∀λ ≥ 0.
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Appendix 4: Proof of Proposition 7
First of all recall that K
RM/RD
(λ), defined equation (31), is the value of the fixed cost
such that the government is indifferent between a regulated monopoly and a regulated
duopoly (i.e. such that EWRM (λ) = EWRD(λ)). A regulated monopoly is preferred
to a regulated duopoly if and only if K ≥ KRM/RD(λ) defined equation (31). Similarly
a regulated monopoly is preferred to no production whenever K ≤ KRM (λ), defined
equation (32). It is preferred to privatisation whenever K ≤ KRM/PM (λ), defined equation
(33). Comparing equations (32) and (33) one can check that K
RM
(λ) > K
RM/PM
(λ).
Moreover using the fact that gmin(β) ≤ 2g(β), one can check that V RD(λ) < 2V RM (λ) so
that K
RM
(λ) > K
RM/RD
(λ). We deduce that if K > K
RM
(λ) regulation is never optimal.
On the other hand if K > V
2
privatisation is not possible. Putting all the pieces together
yields the result.
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